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Abstract—The simultaneous charging of many electric vehicles
(EVs) stresses the distribution system and may cause grid
instability in severe cases. The best way to avoid this problem
is by charging coordination. The idea is that the EVs should
report data (such as state-of-charge (SoC) of the battery) to run a
mechanism to prioritize the charging requests and select the EVs
that should charge during this time slot and defer other requests
to future time slots. However, EVs may lie and send false data
to receive high charging priority illegally. In this paper, we first
study this attack to evaluate the gains of the lying EVs and how
their behavior impacts the honest EVs and the performance of
charging coordination mechanism. Our evaluations indicate that
lying EVs have a greater chance to get charged comparing to
honest EVs and they degrade the performance of the charging
coordination mechanism. Then, an anomaly based detector that
is using deep neural networks (DNN) is devised to identify the
lying EVs. To do that, we first create an honest dataset for
charging coordination application using real driving traces and
information revealed by EV manufacturers, and then we also
propose a number of attacks to create malicious data. We trained
and evaluated two models, which are the multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) and the gated recurrent unit (GRU) using this dataset and
the GRU detector gives better results. Our evaluations indicate
that our detector can detect lying EVs with high accuracy and
low false positive rate.
Index Terms—Charging coordination, deep neural network,
machine learning, recurrent neural network, electric vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a growing interest to adopt more
green transportation in an effort to reduce the associated
carbon emissions and reduce the dependency on crude oil. As
a result, a promising direction is to replace gasoline-powered
vehicles by electric vehicles (EVs). In recent years, the number
of EVs traveling on the roads has been experiencing a dramatic
increase [1]. Another important aspect that helps in the wide
use of EVs is the recent trend of adopting more renewable
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energy sources at consumer side by installing solar cells on the
roof of houses. Due to the intermittent nature of these sources,
EVs can be used to store the excess energy. Regardless of the
numerous advantages that are introduced by the EVs, several
challenges need to be addressed when dealing with deploying
a large number of EVs in the street.
The uncoordinated and simultaneous charging of EVs may
stress the power system and instablize the grid in severe
cases [2], [3]. Accordingly, charging coordination mechanisms
should be used to avoid this problem by balancing charging
demand and power supply [4]. The idea is that each EV should
report data (such as state of charge (SoC) of the battery) to
a charging coordinator (CC) that uses these data to prioritize
the EVs’ charging requests and allow the high-priority EVs
(typically the ones that have low SoC) to charge and defer
other requests to future time slots [5]. Many papers in the
literature have developed charging coordination mechanisms
[6]–[8]. However, these mechanisms assume that EVs report
correct data, but such assumption can not be guaranteed
because EVs are motivated to report false data (e.g. lower
SoC) so that they can charge quickly without deferral.
In this paper, we first evaluate the impact of lying EVs on
the charging coordination application. Specifically, we focus
on evaluating the gains the lying EVs achieve, the harm they
cause to honest EVs and also the impact of the lying EVs
on the performance of the charging coordination mechanism.
Our evaluations confirm that reporting false information is
beneficial for the EVs as they charge first, honest EVs are
harmed by not charging or charging late, and the performance
of the charging coordination mechanism degrades because by
reporting low SoC falsely, excess power is assigned to the
lying EVs which may result in unusing all the power available
for charging.
In order to resolve this issue, we devise a machine learning
model to detect the lying EVs. We first create a dataset for
the charging coordination application. To do that, we use the
real driving traces of vehicles provided in [9] and real EVs
information provided by Kia automotive manufacturer in [10].
Then, we propose several attacks for reporting false SoC by
EVs to the charging coordination mechanism. To balance the
data, we use adaptive synthetic sampling approach (ADASYN)
[11] to compensate the samples of the minor class to be
equal, or nearly equal, to the samples of the major class.
The ADASYN balances the dataset by computing the ratio
between the honest dataset (minor class) and the malicious
dataset (major class), and producing synthetically more honest
data samples for the compensation process. Finally, we use the
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2dataset to create deep learning models to detect lying EVs.
Deep learning has been used in many applications because
of its high accuracy [12] such as face recognition, intrusion
detection, and speech analysis. In this paper, multi-layer
perceptron (MLP) network [13] and deep recurrent neural
network (RNN) [14] are the machine learning models that
are selected for handling the time series nature of our dataset.
However, choosing the best hyper-parameter set for the deep
neural networks is considered a hard optimization problem.
As a result, we use a version of a genetic optimization [15]
technique to find the best architectures for our detectors.
To evaluate our detectors, extensive experiments have been
conducted. Our evaluations confirm that our detectors can
identify the lying EVs with very high accuracy and low false
positive rate.
Comparing to the literature, this paper makes the following
main contributions:
1) We investigate the impacts of reporting false data by EVs
to charging coordination mechanism.
2) We create a new dataset for charging coordination appli-
cation using real vehicles routes and information reported
by an automotive company. We also propose several at-
tacks to report false data. Although, our focus is to create
a dataset that is used to train detectors to identify lying
EVs, our dataset can also be used for other applications
such as prediction of energy demand.
3) We propose deep-learning models to identify lying EVs
and run extensive experiments to evaluate the models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
related work is discussed in section II. Section III describes the
system model. The evaluation of the impact of lying EVs on
charging coordination mechanisms is presented in section IV.
Preliminaries are presented in section V. The dataset created
for pure EVs is presented in section VI. The proposed deep
learning based detectors are discussed in details in section VII.
Our evaluations to the proposed detectors and experimental
results are discussed in section VIII. Our conclusions are
presented in section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first present the existing works on charg-
ing coordination mechanisms. Then, we discuss the existing
datasets for EVs.
A. Charging Coordination Mechanisms
Several works have investigated charging coordination
mechanisms for EVs in the literature. Arias et al. [16] have
proposed an optimized charging coordination mechanism for
finding the best charging schedule that meets the EVs require-
ments and the operational capacity of the electrical distribu-
tion system. The authors use three optimization algorithms
including the tabu search (TS), the greedy randomized adaptive
search procedure (GRASP) and a new hybrid optimization
algorithm that uses both TS and GRASP. Hajforoosh et al.
[17] have proposed a charging coordination mechanism based
on the fuzzy discrete particle swarm optimization (FDPSO)
algorithm and the fuzzy genetic algorithm (FGA). The main
objective of the proposed mechanism is to maximize the
amount of electrical power delivered to the EVs and minimize
the grid losses, distribution transformer loading and the cost
associated with the energy generation. Franco et al. [18] have
proposed a charging coordination mechanism for unbalanced
electrical distribution systems using a mixed integer linear
programming (MILP) technique. The proposed mechanism
aims at reducing the energy cost of EV charging taking into
consideration several factors such as the three phase circuit’s
representation and the load imbalance producing non-linear
programming model that could be converted into a linear
model using linearization techniques that could be solved
easily. However, the above works do not consider preserving
the privacy of the EVs’ drivers.
Mahmoud et al. [19] have introduced a privacy-aware charg-
ing coordination mechanism that preserves the privacy of the
EVs drivers while still optimizing the power supplied to the
EVs without exceeding the total charging capacity. The idea is
that each EV encrypts its charging request in addition to a one-
time secret key with the CC’s public key so that only the CC
can decrypt the request. Then, the CC uses the data provided to
compute charging schedules and encrypt them with the secret
keys sent by the EVs. At the same time, random noise is
added to the data sent by EVs to prevent linking the charging
requests sent from one EV to preserve privacy. In addition, a
modified version of knapsack optimization algorithm is used
to schedule charging of EVs.
Baza et al. [5] have introduced a decentralized charg-
ing coordination mechanism using the blockchain and smart
contract technology. Pazos-Revilla et al. [20] have proposed
two privacy-preserving charging coordination mechanisms.
The first mechanism has a centralized architecture, and uses
blind signature cryptosystem for anonymous authentication.
The second mechanism has a decentralized architecture where
various EVs run the mechanism in a distributed manner. The
idea is that an EV is selected to act as a head node that
decrypts the EVs’ aggregated charging demand and broadcasts
the aggregated demand to the EVs without being able to learn
the individual data of the EVs to preserve privacy. Then, each
EV can compute its charging schedule without exceeding the
maximum charging capacity.
To the best of our knowledge, the existing works in the
literature assume that EVs report correct data to the charging
coordination mechanism. This assumption can not be guar-
anteed because the EVs are motivated to report false data
to charge quickly without deferral. In addition, none of the
existing works have studied the impact of reporting false data
on the charging coordination mechanism or proposed a scheme
to identify the EVs that report wrong data.
B. Dataset for EVs
Khavan-Hejazi et al. [21] have created a dataset for hybrid
EVs that contains a minute-by-minute SoC data as well as
the nodal and temporal charging load of plug-in hybrid EVs
(PHEVs). The dataset has been created by using the driving
traces of 536 gasoline-powered taxi vehicles equipped with
global positioning system (GPS) in San Francisco and the
3nominal operation data of various PHEVs brands. The main
goal is to find the SoC and charging patterns of the vehicles
with the same movement patterns but with various PHEV
technologies. As the vehicles are moving, they switch between
electrical energy and gasoline. The dataset considers two types
of PHEVs. The first one is the charge depleting type that
switches to the gasoline after depleting of the electric battery.
The second type is the charge blending type of PHEV which
switches to the gasoline engine to increase the torque of the
vehicle even if the electric battery is not depleted.
Qinglong in [22] have proposed a model to predict the
amount of stored energy in the EVs of a specific area. A
neural network model combined with linear chain conditional
random field (CRF) are used to create the model. The dataset
which is used for training the neural network is created by
using the GPS trajectories of a set of taxis in Beijing city.
The paper assumes that the SoC of each EV changes linearly
with respect to the distance driven by the vehicle. However,
the linear model used for creating the EV’s dataset is not
mentioned. The paper also assumes that all the EVs recharge
to the full capacity at the begining of each day, which may
not be guaranteed practically. Moreover, the dataset has not
been shared publicly.
Oh et al. [23] have provided a dataset for vehicles including
gasoline powered vehicles, hybrid EVs (HEVs), PHEVs, and
EVs. The dataset is collected using a real-world driving
scenarios for a set of vehicles including driving in different
environments from highways to traffic-dense regions. The
information in this dataset is divided into static and dynamic.
The static information contains the vehicle’s parameters such
as the vehicle type and engine configuration. The dynamic
information contains time-stamped driving records of the
vehicle such as the vehicle’s speed, and battery current, voltage
and SoC. However, this dataset contains the data of only three
EVs, which is very small dataset for training machine learning
models.
Unlike these works, in this paper, we create a new dataset
for charging coordination application including data for lying
EVs.
III. NETWORK AND THREAT MODELS
As shown in Fig. 1, the considered system model consists
of the following entities:
• The charging coordinator (CC): The CC receives charging
requests from EVs, computes charging schedules and
sends them to the EVs. It has to make sure that the
scheduled charging amounts do not exceed the available
charging energy.
• Electric vehicle (EV ): The EVs send charging requests
containing information, such as battery SoC, to the CC
that uses them to compute the charging schedules of the
EVs.
• Collector: It is responsible for collecting the EVs’ charg-
ing requests at a given area and sending them to the
CC. It also receives charging schedules from the CC and
forwards them to the EVs in its area.
• Charging point (CP): It provides the needed electrical
power charging to the EV.
Communication 
Network 
Charging Controller (CC) 
Area 1 Area k 
Collector 
CP 
EV  
Fig. 1: The considered system model.
As shown in Fig. 1, the charging coordination mechanism
is executed by the CC for each geographic area that is usually
connected to one electrical bus. The total amount of power
charging of the EVs in each area should not exceed the
maximum charging capacity known to the CC. The idea is that
time is divided into slots, e.g., 30 minutes for each slot, and
the charging coordination mechanism is run at the beginning
of each time slot. When an EV needs to charge, it should
send a charging request to CC including some information
such as SoC and time to complete charge (TCC) [24]. TCC
is the expiry time of the charging request. After receiving the
charging requests of EVs in a certain area by the CC, if the
total charging demand does not exceed the charging energy
capacity, all EVs can charge. On the other hand, in case that
the total charging demand exceeds the charging capacity, the
CC should run a charging coordination mechanism to select
a subset of the EVs to charge in this time slot and defer
the charging of the other EVs to the next time slots. The
mechanism should prioritize the requests and select the high-
priority requests for charging. Typically, more priority is given
to the EVs that have low SoC. In the literature, there are
different ways to select the subset of EVs that should charge
[17]–[19].
For the threat model, we focus on attacks launched by lying
EVs that send false data in their charging requests to illegally
gain higher priority in charging. In this paper, we propose
different ways to report false data by EVs. We train a machine
learning detector that takes the SoC values reported by an EV
and classifies the EV to honest or liar.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF LYING EVS
In this section, we run multiple experiments to evaluate the
impact of reporting false SoC on the charging coordination
mechanism. Specifically, we are interested in investigating how
this attack: (1) benefits lying EVs, (2) harms the honest EVs,
and (3) degrades the performance of the charging coordination
mechanism.
A. Setup
We use MATLAB [25] to simulate the following charg-
ing coordination scenario. Define a set of n EVs (E =
{EV1, EV2, . . . , EVn}), a set of days (D = {1, . . . , d}), and
a set of time slots of equal time periods (T = {1, . . . , T}),
4for an EVi ∈ E, the SoC value at day d ∈ D and time
t ∈ T is donated by Si(d, t). At time t, EVi sends a charging
request that has some information such as the SoC of the EV
Si(d, t) to the CC. A charging coordination mechanism that
uses the EVs’ charging requests is executed to decide the EVs
that can charge in this time slot. However, lying EVs report
false SoC value (i.e., lower value), denoted by β ∗ Si(d, t)
where 0 ≤ β < 1, to the CC for the purpose of gaining
higher charging priority illegally to charge quickly without
any deferral.
In our experiments, we assume that the maximum capacity
of each EV’s battery is 200 units, the total number of EVs is
100, and the simulation is run for a total of 30 time slots. In
addition, the simulation is run using two charging capacities
per time slot, which are 1080 and 2160 units of power, to
evaluate the impact of reporting false SoC on the charging
coordination mechanism at two different levels of available
charging supply. Initially, the SoC of all vehicles is assumed
to be 0.5 (i.e., the battery of each EV is half charged) with a
time to complete charge (TCC) equal to four. In our experi-
ments, we run the charging coordination mechanism proposed
in [19] that is based on knapsack algorithm, as illustrated in
Algorithm 1. The priority index (PI) of each charging request
is a number between 0 and 1, where the priority of the request
increases as PI increases. PI is calculated as follows:
PI = εf1(SoC) + (1− ε)f2(TCC),
where ε is a factor that is between 0 and 1, and is used to
determine the weights given to SoC and TCC. f1() and f2()
are two functions that map SoC and TCC, respectively, to
numbers between 0 and 1. We assume that ε is 0.5 and f2(x)
is 0.4 when 0 < x ≤ 4. For simplicity, we assume that f1(x)
is a binary function that gives 1 when 0.4 < x ≤ 1 and
0.1 otherwise. In addition, the SoC reported by an honest
EVi is Si(d, t) while the SoC reported by a lying EVi is
β∗Si(d, t) where 0 ≤ β < 1 and Si(d, t) is the true SoC. In the
experiments, we vary β to study different cheating behaviors.
We assume that EVs need to fully charge their batteries, i.e.,
until SoC is 1.
B. Metrics
In this subsection, we define the key metrics that are used
for evaluating the impact of reporting false SoC by EVs to
the charging coordination mechanism. The first metric is the
probability that lying EVs get charged before the expiry of
their charging requests. The second metric is the probability
that honest EVs can charge in the existence of lying EVs.
The third metric we will measure is the amount of unused
energy. As discussed earlier, the lying EVs report lower SoC
to gain higher priority and this may result in assigning more
power to the EVs than what they need which results in unusing
some charging energy, i.e., the total amount of energy charged
by EVs is below the available charging capacity. Note that,
the EVs pay for charging based on the actual consumption
(not the assigned charging power by CC) measured by meters
connected to the charging outlet. Therefore, it is possible that
some power assigned by CC to the lying EVs are not used
Algorithm 1: Charging coordination mechanism used in
[19].
1 function Charging Coordination (SOC, TCC)
2 Csys ← EnergyCapacity
3 ε← 0.5
// X: the amount of energy each EV can
charge in this time slot
4 for i ∈ X
5 Xi ← 0
6 end
// P: the charging amount requested by
EVs
7 for i ∈ SOC
8 Pi ← 1− SOCi
9 end
// PI: priorities of EVs
10 for i ∈ SOC
11
PIi ← εf1(SOCi) + (1− ε)f2(TCCi)
12 end
13 A← PI1/P1 ≥ PI2/P2 · · · ≥ PIn/Pn
14 for i ∈ A
15 if Pi ≤ Csys
16 Xi ← Pi
17 Csys ← Csys − Pi
18 A← A− i
19 end
20 end
// if there is remaining power, provide
it to the EV with the highest
priority
21 L← argmaxAPI
22 XL ← Csys
23 return X
and thus not assigned to other EVs which definitely degrades
the performance of charging coordination mechanism because
it increases the likelihood that EVs’ charging requests are
expired without getting charged.
C. Simulation Results
Fig. 2 gives the probability of selecting honest and lying
EVs for charging at different values of β and total charging
energy. The probability of selecting lying EVs for charging
is the number of lying EVs that fully charge before their
charging requests expire divided by the total number of lying
EVs. Similarly, the probability of selecting honest EVs for
charging is the total number of honest EVs that are selected
for charging before their charging requests expire divided by
the total number of honest EVs. The figure shows that as the
number of lying EVs increases, as the probability of selecting
honest EVs for charging decreases. This is because more lying
EVs are selected for charging because they have higher (false)
priority. At a certain number of lying EVs, the probability of
selecting honest EVs becomes zero. This is because at this
point, none of the honest EVs are selected and the lying EVs
are always selected. For instance, when β is 0.2 and the total
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(a) β = 0.2 and total charging energy is 1080.
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(b) β = 0.8 and total charging energy is 1080.
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(c) β = 0.2 and total charging energy is 2160.
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(d) β = 0.8 and total charging energy is 2160.
Fig. 2: The probability of selecting honest and lying EVs for charging at different values of β and total charging energy.
charging energy is 2160, 12 EVs are selected for charging in
each time slot. So, when the number of lying EVs is at least
12, none of the honest EVs are selected and the lying EVs are
always selected because they have higher priority.
It can also be seen that the probability of selecting lying
EVs is consistently one until the lying EVs reaches to a certain
number, and after that, the probability starts to decrease. The
justification for this behavior is that when the system has many
lying EVs, some lying EVs may not be selected for charging
before their charging requests expire. It can also be seen that
as β decreases, fewer number of honest EVs are selected for
charging. For instance, from Figs. 2(c) and 2(d) where β is
0.2 and 0.8, when the numbers of lying EVs are 12 and 18,
respectively, the number of honest EVs selected for charging is
zero. In addition, fewer number of EVs are selected at higher
β because as β decreases, more power is assigned to lying
EVs so less power is left to honest EVs, which results in
selecting fewer number of EVs without exceeding the total
charging energy. Morever, by comparing Figs. 2(a) and 2(c)
and Figs. 2(b) and 2(d), it can be seen that by reducing the
total charging energy from 2160 to 1080, fewer number of
EVs are selected for charging in each time slot. This results
in selecting fewer number of honest EVs, and also reducing
the probability of charging lying EVs at a smaller number of
EVs. Therefore, lying EVs have a more severe impact as the
available charging energy reduces.
Fig. 3 gives the average amount of unused power versus the
number of lying EVs. As shown in the figure, as the number
of lying EVs increases, more power is unused because more
lying EVs are selected for charging, and as explained earlier,
charging energy is unused because more power is assigned to
lying EVs than what they actually need. At a certain number
of lying EVs, the unused power is saturated. This is because
all the selected EVs for charging at this number are lying
ones. It can also be seen that as β decreases, i.e., reporting
more lower SoC, more power is unused because more power
is assigned to the lying EVs. Finally, comparing the two cases
of total energy, it can be seen that more power is unused when
the total charging energy increases from 1080 to 2160 because
more lying EVs are selected for charging.
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Fig. 3: The average unused power per time slot.
V. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present a brief description of deep
learning and optimization techniques that will be used in the
design of our detectors.
A. Deep Learning
Deep learning is a special case of neural networks charac-
terized by more than one middle hidden layer. The traditional
structure of neural networks generally consists of three basic
layers: input, output and one or more hidden layers [26].
Deep networks can extract complex attributes (features) from
unstructured data which is a complex task especially when
the attributes are hard to obtain [27]. Deep learning could be
categorized into supervised and unsupervised. In supervised
deep learning, a labeled dataset is used to compute a deep
learning model. Examples of such deep learning networks are
the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) [28], convolutional neural
network (CNN) [29], and recurrent neural network (RNN)
[30]. Regrading the unsupervised deep learning, its main
objective is to cluster unlabeled data with similar features
together, Deep autoencoder network [31] is an example of
these kind of networks.
Backpropagation is the algorithm that is used to update the
network weights according to the error between the real label y
of an input sample and the output of the deep network z [32]
using Gradient descent (GD) [27] technique. Batch gradient
descent is a modification on the traditional GD, in which the
weights are computed by averaging over the whole dataset. In
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [33], the weight gradients
are averaged over a small subset of the whole training dataset
that is called the mini-batch. From the numerous categories
of the deep learning models that have been stated before,
our focus in this paper is on the supervised category and
specifically on the deep recurrent neural network (RNN) and
the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) that will be described in
more details in the following subsections.
B. Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
MLP is a type of deep neural networks (DNN) [28], which
includes an input layer for receiving the input, an output layer
Input Layer
Middle Layer
Output Layer
Fig. 4: Architecture of multi-layer perceptron (MLP)
network.
Xt-1  
Yt-1 
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Yt 
Xt+1 
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Ht 
Fig. 5: Architecture of deep recurrent neural network (RNN).
for producing the decision and one or more of the middle
layers as shown in Fig. 4. The middle layers are the ones that
are responsible for the non-linear operations that are done on
the input to compute an output decision on the last layer. MLP
is usually used to solve non-linear classification problems or
problems that have a non-linear separable set of patterns. This
non-linearity is achieved by using a given function, called
activation function, in each of the neurons of the hidden layer
and at the output layer. The most commonly used activation
functions are Sigmoid, Tanh, Threshold and Softmax.
C. Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
Both inputs and outputs are independent in conventional
neural networks, but in applications that need to predict the
next word of a sentence, the preceding words are required.
Thus, as shown in Fig. 5, an RNN [34] uses hidden layer(s) to
solve this problem. RNN’s main and most significant function
is the hidden state (Ht), which recalls some information about
the sequence of the data [35]. The node-to-node connections
in RNNs form a directed graph along a temporal sequence
and this reflects the temporal dynamic behavior. Unlike feed-
forward neural networks, input sequences can be processed
by RNNs using their hidden state (memory) that makes them
7perfect for tasks such as unsegmented handwriting recognition
or recognition of voice [36]. Feedback loops are used to
process the input data sequence producing the final output,
that can also be a data sequence. Such feedback loops allow
the retention of information and this effect is often represented
as memory that preserves all the measured parameters and
links the inputs together and allows sequential and temporal
information to be processed by RNNs. The algorithm that is
used by the RNNs to loop information back into the network
throughout the computational process for updating the weights
through the network is backpropagation through time (BPTT)
[37].
Long sequences RNNs have a difficulty to carry (remember)
information from earlier time steps to the later steps. Thus,
during the parsing process of a long text paragraph for
prediction purposes, RNNs may ignore important information
from earlier steps. In addition, during the backpropagation
technique, RNNs could suffer from the vanishing gradient
problem, that is when the gradient weight becomes too small
as it back propagates through time so that it does not contribute
enough during the learning process. Accordingly, the learning
process of the layers that get small gradient update, are stopped
and usually those layers are the earlier layers. As these layers
are not involved in the learning process, RNNs may forget
important details from earlier stages, as mentioned before,
when it encounters long sequences, and thus having what we
call, short-term memory. Accordingly, two special kinds of the
RNN are introduced in literature to solve this problem, namely,
Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [38], and Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) [39]. Their internal structure contains internal
mechanisms, called gates, which can regulate the information
flow. The learning process of these gates involves teaching
what is important to keep and what can be thrown away, so that
during the parsing of long sequences, relevant information can
be passed down the long chain for making predictions. These
two RNNs are commonly used in different applications such
as: text generation, speech recognition, caption generation of
videos and speech synthesis. The GRU is a variation of the
LSTM with a reduced set of gates while having the same
ability to address the vanishing gradient problem.
D. Genetic Optimization Technique
Genetic algorithm (GA) [40] is a searching strategy that
is used to find the best or fittest solution for a given (opti-
mization) problem. GA represents a population of candidate
solutions using a genetic representation. After that, GA moves
toward a better solution using evolutionary concepts such as
the natural selection and survival of the fittest.
Five phases are considered in GA which are: initial popula-
tion, fitness function, selection, crossover, and mutation. The
process begins with a set of individuals which are considered
as a population, where each individual is a solution to the
problem we want to solve. In addition, an individual (solution)
is represented in a chromosome form which is a string of
genes where each gene represents a variable (parameter) that
characterizes this individual. Each individual in the population
is evaluated using the fitness function to give the individual
TABLE I: Operational data of Kia Soul EV.
Brand Kia
Model Soul
Battery Capacity (KWh) 64
Ave. Electric Range (Mi) 230
Max Charge Rate (KW) 7.2
Power Consumption (Wh/mi) 275
a fitness score. The individuals with the highest fitness are
selected in the selection phase and their genes are passed
to the next generation. The crossover phase is done on each
pair of selected individuals where a random crossover point is
chosen from the genes and an offspring solution is created by
exchanging the genes of the two parents among themselves
until the crossover point is reached. Consequently, a new
offspring solution is added to the population.
From the newly created offspring individuals, some could be
subject to the mutation process with a low random probability.
This implies that some of the genes of the chromosomes can
be flipped. Mutation occurs to maintain diversity within the
population and prevent premature convergence. In addition, a
small portion of the fittest solutions are copied into the next
generation. This process is called elitism, and could have a
dramatic impact on the performance by ensuring that the GA
does not waste time in re-discovering previously discarded
partial solutions. Elitism guarantees that the solution quality
obtained by the GA does not degrade from one generation to
the next. The whole process is repeated for every population
until the GA converges. At this point the GA provides a
set of solutions to our problem. Convergence means that
the algorithm does not produce an offspring that is notably
different from the previous generation.
VI. EV’S DATASET
In this section, we explain how we created a dataset for
charging coordination application using real driving traces
of vehicles and technical information released by an EV
manufacturer. Although, our focus is to create a dataset that
is used to train a detector to identify lying EVs, our dataset
can also be used for other applications such as prediction of
energy demand.
A. Honest Dataset Creation
For creating the honest dataset, we use driving routes of
536 taxis in San Francisco, CA, released in [9]. The data
recording began on May 17, 2008 and finished on June, 10,
2008. For each taxi, each data row contains a time-stamp,
latitude, and longitude. In our dataset, we consider Kia Soul
EV [10]. In addition to using the real routes in [9], we also
use information released by Kia company. These information
are summarized in Table I. As shown in the table, the EV
uses a charging technique [10], in which the grid provides
the EV with the required amount of electrical power using
8the alternating current (AC) which is converted into a direct
current (DC) using the EV’s own rectifier (converter).
In our dataset, the SoC is linearly dependant on the distance
driven by the EVs [22]. To compute the SoC at every minute
for each EV, we initialize the SoC value randomly, and then
for every minute, we check if the EV is moving or not. If it is
moving, then we first compute the distance using the EV speed
and the time, and then we compute the power consumption of
the EV by multiplying this distance by the power consumption
rate given in Table I, and finally update the value of the SoC by
subtracting the ratio of the power consumed and the maximum
battery capacity from the current SoC value. If the EV is
not moving then we check if it is charging or not. If it is
charging, then the SoC value is updated by adding the ratio
of the amount of the power drawn and the EV’s capacity. If
the EV is not charging then the new SoC value is the same as
the old value.
A benign dataset is created for each EV of the 536 EVs
that describes its normal behavior. The behavior of each EV
is introduced using 24 rows in the dataset representing the
normal behavior of the EV in 24 days. Each row contains T
features, resembles the SoC values reported every τ minutes
for that EV. In this paper, τ is selected to be 30 minutes
producing a set of (T = 48) features in each row. A total
of 12, 864 data samples are created to represent the benign
dataset.
Fig. 6 shows the SoC values of two EVs for one day. As
observed from the figures, the SoC initial values are different
for the two EVs, and the SoC values start to decrease at a
certain hour which indicates that the EVs are moving, however,
at some time the SoC values start to increase indicating that
the EVs are charging at these points of time.
Fig. 7 shows the SoC values of two EVs through 24 days.
As shown in the figures, for each of the two EVs, there is
a different SoC pattern indicating charging or not charging,
and moving or still. This indicates that each EV has a normal
behavior consistent with its pattern of SoC, and our detector
will try to detect the EVs that deviates from their normal
behavior and label them liars.
In Fig. 8, the auto correlation function (ACF) for one
EV from the dataset is shown. The ACF is the similarity
between observations (SoC values) as a function of the time
lag between them. As shown in the figure, there is a positive
correlation for the EV’s ACF which is an indication of the
regularity in the SoC charging patterns of a normal EV that
can be used by our detector for detecting lying EVs.
B. Malicious Dataset Creation
Regarding the creation of malicious dataset, different attack
scenarios are considered for reporting false SoC to the charg-
ing coordinator mechanism. These attacks are summarized
in Table II. Four types of attacks are considered which are
two versions of a partial reduction attack and two versions of
selective time filtering attacks [41]. The SoC of EVi at time
t and day d is Si(d, t) and the reported SoC by EVi to the
CC is RSi(d, t). If EVi is honest, then RSi(d, t) should be
equal to Si(d, t) all the time. As illustrated in Table II, in
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Fig. 8: The ACF of the SoC of one EV for several days
from the dataset.
Attack #1, the attacker tries to deceive the CC by multiplying
the correct SoC value by a constant value α that is less than
one to report lower SoC to gain high charging priority. In
Attack #2, the EV tries to deceive the CC by manipulating the
SoC value that is sent to the CC by multiplying it by a value
that is controlled by a time-dependent function βi(d, t) that
should be less than one, e.g. 0.1 ≤ βi(d, t) ≤ 0.8. In Attack
#3, the EV uses a selective time filtering technique, where
the malicious EV reports SoC of zero (or small value) during
the interval tb ≤ t ≤ te, otherwise, it reports its correct SoC
9TABLE II: Attacks for reporting false SoC.
Attack
no. Attack type Formula
Attack #1
Partial reduction
attack
RSi(d, t) = αSi(d, t)
Attack #2 RSi(d, t) = βi(d, t)Si(d, t)
Attack #3
Selective time
filtering attack
RSi(d, t) =
{
0 tb ≤ t ≤ te
Si(d, t) else
Attack #4 RSi(d, t) =
{
βi(d, t)Si(d, tb) tb ≤ t ≤ te
Si(d, t) else
(Si(d, t)). Attack #4 is similar to Attack #3 but EVi selects
a specific time interval tb ≤ t ≤ te so that the SoC values that
are reported in this time interval are decreased gradually, and
for other times, EVi reports its actual SoC (Si(d, t)). In our
dataset, the four attacks are applied on each row in the benign
dataset producing a malicious dataset which contains 51, 456
records.
C. Data Augmentation and Balancing
Data augmentation is the process of increasing the number
of data samples for the purpose of creating an accurate and
robust model [42]. As it is known, as the number of samples
increases in the dataset, the trained model becomes more
accurate [43]. Imbalance problem occurs when one of the
classes has more samples in the dataset than the other classes
[44]. Training a classifier model using imbalanced data could
produce a classifier biased towards the class (classes) with
the largest number of samples in the dataset. Therefore, data
balancing techniques should be used when there are some
data distributions that are significantly dominating other data
distributions in the sample space to create accurate classifiers.
A solution for this problem is by using a data augmentation
technique for increasing the number of samples in the minority
class synthetically. The most common technique that is used
for data augmentation for the purpose of balancing the dataset
is the oversampling technique. Two common oversampling
techniques [11] are:
• Sampling techniques: In these techniques, the imbalanced
dataset is compensated by oversampling, e.g., providing
more copies of some of the samples of the minority
class or undersampling the samples of the class with the
majority number of samples.
• Synthetic data generation: In these techniques, the im-
balance problem is solved by generating a synthetic
data samples for balancing the original dataset. Common
techniques that are under this category are the synthetic
minority oversampling technique (SMOTE) [45] and the
adaptive synthetic (ADASYN) sampling approach [11].
In our dataset, we used the synthetic data generation technique
because the sampling techniques suffer from the overfitting
problem that could occur due to creating exact copies of the
original data [46].
ADASYN sampling approach is a synthetic data generation
technique for balancing minor classes in datasets and is
considered an improved extension version of the SMOTE
technique [11]. In our dataset, the honest class is the minority
that needs to be balanced with the malicious class. For using
the ADASYN [11] in our dataset, both classes should exist in
the dataset, which are the minority class (honest class) and the
majority class (malicious class). The reason for that is because
ADASYN tries to balance the minority class with the majority
class by calculating the ratio between the number of samples
of the two classes for compensating the minority class with
a larger number of synthetic samples to reach the number of
the majority class samples. The ADASYN algorithm can be
summarized in the following steps:
1) ADASYN computes the degree of the class imbalance in
dataset:
ratio =
mmin
mmax
,
where, mmin and mmax are the number of samples in
the minority and majority classes, respectively and that
ratio ∈ (0, 1].
2) If ratio < ratioth where, ratioth is the present thresh-
old for the maximum degree of tolerance for the class
imbalance ratio, then:
• The total number of synthetic minority data samples
need to be generated by ADASYN is :
G = (mmax −mmin)ξ,
where, ξ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter used to determine the
required balance degree after finishing the process of
synthetic data generation. When ξ = 1, this indicates
that a fully balanced dataset is required after the
generation process is finished.
• For each of the minority samples, ADASYN considers
the k-nearest neighbors and calculates the r value:
ri =
∂i
k
,
where ∂i is the number of samples in the k nearest
neighbors of sample i based on the Euclidean distance
rule in n-dimensional space that belongs to the majority
class. ri value indicates the dominance of the majority
class in the neighborhood.
• Before the number of synthetic samples to be generated
is finally determined, ADASYN normalizes ri values
for all minority samples so that their sum is one:
rˆi =
ri∑
ri
,
where
∑
rˆi = 1.
• The ADASYN calculates the number of synthetic
samples to be generated in each neighborhood as
follows:
gi = rˆi ∗G.
Since gi is calculated using the respective ri value for
every minority class sample, ADASYN creates more
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synthetic samples in neighborhoods with a greater ratio
of majority to minority observations.
• For each sample xi from the minority class, there are
gi samples to be generated by looping from 1 to gi and
doing the following:
– randomly choose a data sample xj from the K
nearest neighbors of the data sample xi.
– generate synthetic observations:
si = xi + (xj − xi)λ,
where si is the generated synthetic sample, xi is
sample i from the samples of the minority class,
and λ is a random number between 0 and 1.
The ADASYN’s main advantage is that it uses a density
distribution, rˆi, as a way to automatically determine the
number of synthetic samples that should be generated for
each sample in the minority class, which is considered as an
advantage over the SMOTE algorithm which generates the
same number of synthetic samples for each original minority
sample.
VII. PROPOSED LYING ELECTRIC VEHICLE DETECTOR
In this section, we discuss the details of the proposed
lying EV detector. The proposed detector is based on DNN
classification and its designing process consists of two stages.
The first is a learning (training) stage, in which the structure
and parameters of the detector are defined, and the second is
the stage of optimizing the classifier’s hyper-parameters using
a genetic optimization based approach for fine tuning. Two
set of classifiers, namely, the GRU and MLP networks, are
considered.
A. Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) Based detector
As shown in Fig. 4, the MLP detector consists of an input
layer that receives the SoC values reported by an EV to classify
it using nonlinear activation functions that exist in the middle
and output layers. The network weights are updated in an
iterative manner using two operations at each round. Firstly,
given a set of training samples pairs in the form (xi, yi),
where i = {1, 2, . . . , n} and n is the number of training
samples used to train the network, the network output could
be represented as z = f(x,w), where z is the output of
the given input sample x, and w is the weights-vector of
the network. Secondly, the backpropagation process in which
the gradient descent technique is used to update the network
weights according to the error between the real label y of the
input sample and the output of the deep network z. Stochastic
gradient descend (SGD) [33] is the algorithm which is used
during the backpropagation phase for updating the weights of
the network links.
The weights are updated using the difference between the
model output and the real label error according to Eq. 1.
wt+1 ← wt − η∇wL(Dt, wt) (1)
where wt+1 is the weight vector of the network model at round
t + 1, wt is the weight vector of the network model at the
round t, η is the learning rate, Dt is a subset of the training
dataset D at round t (the mini batch), L() is the error function
that is used to compute the error between the real output and
the predicted value (i.e., minimum square error), and ∇w is
the gradient of the error function or the differentiation of the
error function with respect to weight w. The output layer of
the MLP detector consists of two nodes to classify the input
into one of two classes either to be honest or lying EVs.
B. Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) Based detector
As shown in Fig. 9, the GRU detector consists of an input
layer, a group of hidden layers and an output layer. The input
layer is the one that is responsible for receiving the vector
RSi(d, ∗) that represents the SoC values of EVi during day
d at different reporting time periods t ∈ T, where the vector
has T values. The detector has L hidden layers following the
input layer, where each consists of N neurons with a given
activation function. The input layer receives an input vector
and sends data to middle layers that do computations and send
data to output layer to produce an output vector, that has two
neurons to classify a given input into either honest or liar.
Therefore, the output of the last layer is two elements vector in
the form y(RSi(d, ∗)) = (0, 1)T for a benign (honest) EVi or
y(RSi(d, ∗)) = (1, 0)T in case of a lying EVi. Given L layers,
for each layer l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, the output is denoted by ol
and o0 = RSi(d, ∗). Each hidden layer l ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1},
contains the following parameters:
• The input at time t is ol−1t , which is the output of the
previous layer l − 1.
• The hidden state slt−1, that represents the memory com-
putations using the previous layer’s hidden state.
• The update gate of layer l and state t is computed using
the input vector ol−1t and previous hidden state s
l
t−1 as
follows: zlt = σ(o
l−1
t U
l
z + s
l
t−1W
l
z + b
l
z). The learning
process is responsible for the modification of the weight
matrices U lz and W
l
z to reduce the error. σ(·) is the
activation function while blz is the bias for the neurons in
layer l.
• The reset gate is calculated as follows: rlt = σ(o
l−1
t U
l
r +
slt−1W
l
r + b
l
r) where U
l
r, W
l
r, U
l
h, and W
l
h are weights
that are learned during the training process.
• Finally, the current hidden state is computed as slt =
(1−zlt)hlt+zltslt−1, where  is the Hadmard product
and hlt = tanh(o
l−1
t U
l
h+(s
l
t−1rlt)W lh+blh). The output
at time t is olt = softmax(V
lslt + b
l
o), where V
l is a
weight matrix that is learned by the training process.
C. Hyper-parameters Optimization
Optimum parameters improve the performance of the de-
tectors. Although tuning the detectors’ hyper-parameters is a
difficult and time-consuming process because of the extensive
computation required, an exhaustive search for hyperparame-
ters is practically impossible, which motivates us to use the
non-dominated sort genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) [47], [48] for
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Fig. 9: Architecture of the gated recurrent unit (GRU) based
detector.
finding an efficient solution in a reduced time compared with
the exhaustive grid search [49].
In this paper, the NSGA-II is used to tune the hyper-
parameters of the RNN architecture such as: the number of
hidden layers L, the number of neurons per layer N , the type
of optimization algorithm O, the initialization method for the
parameters H , the dropout rate D, the weight constraint J , and
the type of activation functions at the hidden layers Ahd and
output layers Aop. The NSGA is a multiple objective optimiza-
tion algorithm and is an instance of evolutionary algorithms.
There are two versions of the algorithm: the classical NSGA
and the updated and currently canonical form, called NSGA-
II. The NSGA’s objective is to enhance the adaptive fit of a
population of candidate solutions to a Pareto front restricted by
a set of objective functions. The algorithm uses an evolutionary
process with surrogates, including selection, genetic crossover
and genetic mutation, for evolutionary operators. The popu-
lation is sorted into a sub-population hierarchy based on the
superiority of Pareto’s order. An optimal choice of these hyper-
parameters significantly improves the detection performance.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, the evaluation methodology that is used to
measure the performance of the proposed detector is explained,
and then the evaluation results are discussed.
A. Key Performance Metrics and Experiment Methodology
We define the following key performance metrics which are
used in our evaluation process:
• Detection Accuracy (ACC): The ratio of the number of
true positives and true negatives over the total number of
EVs.
Accuracy (ACC) =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(2)
TP represents true positives and is defined as the
number of lying EVs that are correctly classified as
lying. TN is the true negatives and is defined as the
number of honest EVs that are correctly classified as
honest. FP denotes false positives and is defined as the
number of honest EVs incorrectly classified as lying.
FN represents false negatives and is defined as the
number of lying EVs incorrectly classified as honest.
• True Positive Rate (TPR): The ratio of the true positives
to the total number of lying EVs
True Positive Rate (TPR) =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
• False Positive Rate (FPR): The ratio of the false positives
to the total number of honest EVs
False Positive Rate (FPR) =
FP
FP + TN
(4)
• Detection Rate (DR): The ratio of the number of truly
detected lying EVs to the total number of EVs classified
as lying.
Detection Rate (DR) =
TP
TP + FP
(5)
• False Acceptance Rate (FA): It is the ratio of the number
of honest EVs classified as lying to the number of honest
EVs.
False Acceptance (FA) =
FP
TN + FP
(6)
• Highest Difference (HD): it is the difference between
detection rate (DR) and the false acceptance (FA).
Highest Difference (HD) = DR− FA (7)
• Area Under Curve (AUC): It is the area under the receiver
operating curve (ROC). The ROC curve is a graphical
way that captures the relationship between TPR and FPR
[50].
To evaluate the performance of the proposed detectors, the
dataset is splitted into two parts. The first part constitutes 70%
of the whole dataset, and is used for the training process
of the detectors. The second part is used in the test phase
and constitutes about 30% of the whole dataset. The GRU
and MLP models are trained using the training dataset and
evaluated using the testing dataset. The hyber-parameters of
these models are adjusted using the non-dominated sort genetic
algorithm (NSGA-II) to choose the best hyper-parameters that
provide the best results.
B. Results and Discussion
In this subsection, the results of the proposed detection
models are discussed. In Table III, the results of the best
network architectures, i.e., the architectures that provide the
best results, for the GRU and MLP models are presented. In
addition, the ROC curves of both architectures are presented
in Fig. 10.
As it can be seen in Table III, the performance of the GRU
detector outperforms that of the MLP detector with higher DR
and ACC and lower FA. These results can be interpreted by
the fact that the GRU has the ability to exploit the time series
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TABLE III: Evaluation results of deep neural network models.
Classifier DR FA HD Accuracy
GRU 0.952 0.0495 0.903 0.951
MLP 0.876 0.0497 0.827 0.913
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Fig. 10: The ROC curve for the GRU and MLP detector.
correlation in the SoC values that are reported from the EV
for providing the best detection results. In addition, the good
detection performance of the MLP comes on the expense of
the high complexity of the architecture that is used to provide
this performance. The MLP’s results given in Table III are
provided using a complicated architecture that composes of six
layers with 768 neurons each with Softmax activation function
at the output layer and ReLU activation function at the hidden
layer.
On the contrary, the GRU detector provides the highest
performance using a less complex architecture that composes
of only two layers of 128 neurons each, Softsign activation
function at the hidden layer and Softmax activation function at
the output layer, resulting in a much faster detector comparing
to the MLP detector with higher performance. This reduction
in the model complexity is also attributed to the nature of
the GRU RNN that exploits the time series nature of the
data providing good results with a much less complex model.
The ROC curve in Fig. 10 gives the performance of the two
detectors in a visualization format using area under the curve
metric which is 0.95 for the GRU detector and 0.91 for the
MLP detector.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Recently, EVs started to gain momentum due to their obvi-
ous advantages over gasoline vehicles. However, integrating
EVs into the power grid requires a charging coordination
mechanism to balance the charging load of the EVs with the
power supply. The existing charging coordination mechanisms
assume that the EVs report honest SoC values, although this
is not beneficial to them. In this paper, we have first evaluated
the impact of reporting false SoC values on the charging
coordination mechanism. Then we have proposed a detector
using deep learning techniques to identify lying EVs. Since
the reported SoC values have a time series correlation, a deep
neural network (DNN), has been selected to be the classifier
that is used in the detection process. The selection process
of the architecture of the deep network that provides the best
performance is considered as an optimization problem with
multi-objectives (detection rate and false acceptance rate). Ac-
cordingly, to solve this problem, we used the non-dominated
sort genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) to find the best architecture.
However, for creating an accurate detector, a large dataset
should be used in the training process. Therefore, we have
created a new dataset and proposed a number of attacks and
used them to create the malicious data. The proposed detector
has been evaluated and the results indicate that the detector
achieves a high detection rate with a low false acceptance rate.
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